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Behavior in a Shared Resource Game with
Cooperative, Greedy, and Vigilante Players
Christopher Griffin and George Kesidis
Abstract—We study a problem of trust in a distributed system
in which a common resource is shared by multiple parties.
In such naturally information-limited settings, parties abide
by a behavioral protocol that leads to fair sharing of the
resource. However, greedy players may defect from a cooperative
protocol and achieve a greater than fair share of resources, often
without significant adverse consequences to themselves. In this
paper, we study the role of a few vigilante players who also
defect from a cooperative resource-sharing protocol but only
in response to perceived greedy behavior. For a simple model
of engagement, we demonstrate surprisingly complex dynamics
among greedy and vigilante players. We show that the best
response function for the greedy-player under our formulation
has a jump discontinuity, which leads to conditions under which
there is no Nash equilibrium. To study this property, we formulate
an exact representation for the greedy player best response
function in the case when there is one greedy player, one
vigilante player and N − 2 cooperative players. We use this
formulation to show conditions under which a Nash equilibrium
exists. We also illustrate that in the case when there is no Nash
equilibrium, then the discrete dynamic system generated from
fictitious play will not converge, but will oscillate indefinitely as
a result of the jump discontinuity. The case of multiple vigilante
and greedy players is studied numerically. Finally, we explore
the relationship between fictitious play and the better response
dynamics (gradient descent) and illustrate that this dynamical
system can have a fixed point even when the discrete dynamical
system arising from fictitious play does not.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study the problem of trust in a distributed
system in which a common resource is shared by many parties
or players. In such distributed systems, cooperation and trust
are required for the fair and efficient use of a common resource
by a plurality of parties/players. Often in such naturally
information-limited settings, the players abide by a behavioral
protocol that leads to fair sharing of resource. However, a
greedy player may defect from a cooperative protocol and
achieve a greater than fair share of resources, often without
significant adverse consequences if any. This problem has a
long history, e.g., [1]–[4], and a broad range of applications
- e.g., in [5], the problem of efficient cooperation of two
processes that a share resource is studied from a control-
theoretic perspective. The more general problem of trust and
cooperation remains an active area of research in multiple
disciplines [6]–[8]. A principle challenge is attribution, and
perhaps even detection, of deviation from cooperative behavior
by some greedy players.
Upon detection of greedy behavior (essentially, detection of
a breech of trust), all players may defect from cooperative
behavior leading to a less efficient uncooperative (anarchistic)
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equilibrium or possibly deadlock and a “tragedy of the com-
mons” [9]. In this paper, we consider a much more measured
response by only a small number of “vigilante” players that
also defect from cooperative play but only after greedy behav-
ior has been detected. The intention of such vigilante play is
to entice greedy players back to cooperative play by creating
a near deadlock situation in which all players suffer. For an
“objective based” model of engagement, we show surprisingly
complex behavior among greedy and vigilante players.
Specifically, we assume a shared resource can be accessed
by any of N users at any time, but two users cannot access the
resource at the same time. Each user i chooses a probability
qi of accessing the resource at any given time. Thus, the
probability that user i can access the resource is:
Ti(q1, . . . , qN ) = qi
∏
j 6=i
(1 − qj) (1)
An example of this model is a synchronous, random-access
ALOHA local-area communications network [10]. In this
system, users transmit at random and simultaneous communi-
cations cause collision, which results in failed communication.
Cooperative use of a resource is common in communications
systems in which all users assume that most, if not all,
other users adhere to agreed upon protocols of behavior,
e.g., Internet protocols like TCP congestion control, even if
cooperation is not in their immediate best interest. Various
distributed mechanisms have been implemented to coopera-
tively desynchronize demand (e.g., TCP, ALOHA, CSMA).
Typically, when congestion is detected, all end-devices are
expected to slow down their transmission rates and then slowly
increase again hoping to find a fair and efficient equilibrium.
However, if some users employ alternative implementations
of the prescribed (“by rule”) protocols, e.g., ones that slow
down less than they should, or even increase their transmission
rate in the presence of congestion, the result could be an
unfair allocation or even congestion collapse, see, e.g., [11],
[12]. There is a steadily growing literature on communications
that analyzes the equilibria of different distributed network
resource allocation games, e.g., [13]–[23]; these results are
relevant to more general resource sharing problems. The
experience with TCP in particular, e.g., [24], has shown that
developers do create versions of the protocol that depart
from the standard, cooperative (by-rule) congestion-avoidance
algorithm, like Turbo TCP, but that the great majority of end-
hosts employ the standard cooperative protocol.
Our objective in this paper is to formulate a model that
combines the objective functions of greedy players, vigilante
players and cooperative players. Cooperative players follow a
prescribed (fair) protocol and are not selfish utility maximizers.
Greedy players are selfish utility maximizers whose objective
is to take-over the resource. A vigilante player prefers to
follow a fair resource sharing protocol, but will increase her
transmission rate to punish perceived greediness. As a part of
this work, we show that the cyclic behavior induced in [25]
through fixed rules can result from a discontinuity in the best-
response function.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II we lay out the preliminary formulae used in the
2remainder of this paper. In Section III we provide details
on our model, including greedy and altruistic player utility
functions. We analyze a two-player system in Section IV
we explicitly study a simplified two player shared channel
model and characterize the jump discontinuity in the best
response function of the greedy player and its effect on
Nash Equilibria. In Section V we study multi-player systems
numerically when there are multiple greedy players or multiple
vigilante players and compare our results to the results of
better-response dynamics. Finally we provide conclusions and
future directions in Section VI.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
Let q ∈ [0, 1] be the transmission probability for a cooper-
ative player in our distributed resource game. In a game with
N players, q = 1/N , the fair allocation of the resource to
a cooperative player. Let g ∈ [0, 1] be the resource access
probability of the greedy player. Presumably, g ≥ q for
any fixed N . Finally, let a ∈ [0, 1] be the resource access
probability of the vigilante player. Presumably, a ≥ q for
any N . The expected resource access probability for a greedy
player is:
Θ(g, a) := g(1− a)
(
1−
1
N
)N−2
, (2)
with the corresponding expected resource access probability
for the vigilante player is:
Φ(g, a) := a(1 − g)
(
1−
1
N
)N−2
= Θ(a, g). (3)
All other players access the resource with probability:
1
N
(1 − a)(1− g)
(
1−
1
N
)N−3
.
In the absence of knowledge of the vigilante, the greedy player
expects a = 1/N and thus would like to maximize Θ
(
g, 1
N
)
,
which can be accomplished by setting g = 1 to obtain a
resource access probability of:
Θ0 :=
(
1−
1
N
)N−1
. (4)
In the absence of knowledge of the greedy player, the vigilante
player expects g = 1/N and expects a resource access
probability of:
Φ0 :=
1
N
(
1−
1
N
)N
(5)
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Suppose now the vigilante player expects a (single) greedy
player. Using an estimate of her resource access probability
Φˆ, an estimate can be obtained for g as:
gˆ :=
[
a
(
N−1
N
)N−2
− Φˆ
a
(
N−1
N
)N−2
]1
0
. (6)
The vigilante player now wishes to enforce fairness unilat-
erally, by modifying her access probability to punish greedy
players. However, it is possible the vigilante player is sensitive
to her impact on the community e.g., in the case when the
greedy player is only a little greedy. In this case, the objective
function of the vigilante player to be minimized can be written
as:
Ua(g, a; ρ) := (Θ(g, a)− Φ0)
2
+ ρ
(
a−
1
N
)2
. (7)
Here ρ is a control parameter that adjusts the extent to which
the vigilante is willing to sacrifice her principles of good
behavior to punish a greedy player. As we will see, this
parameter can have a substantial impact on existence of the
underlying system equilibria.
Conversely, the greedy player wishes to maximize his re-
source access probability and is willing to violate the commu-
nal policy of fairness (e.g., g = 1/N ) to do so. However, the
greedy player realizes there may be a vigilante who will punish
him for bad behavior and hence may modulate his behavior
back toward the communal norm if he detects his expected
resource access probability Θˆ is well below his desired value
Θ0. The greedy player’s objective function to be minimized
can be formulated as:
Ug(g, a;λ) := (Θ(g, a)−Θ0)
2
·
(
1 + λ
(
g −
1
N
)2)
. (8)
Note that as Θ(g, a)−Θ0 approaches zero, then for any fixed
value λ, λ
(
g − 1
N
)2
also approaches zero and the effect of(
g − 1
N
)2 diminishes. Thus a successful greedy player ignores
the fact he is not playing fairly, while an unsuccessful greedy
player will throttle back his greediness to try to find a better
outcome. We note that the function Ug has three (first order)
critical points given by:
Cg =
{
N − 1
N(1− a)
,
N − 3a+ 2
(1− a)N
±
√
−
8
λ
+
(a− 2 +N)
2
N2 (a− 1)
2
}
,
while the function Ua has a single critical point given by:
1
4
4 g2 − g + 2 ρ
g2 + ρ
. (9)
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we will study the
game in which both the greedy and vigilante players are utility
minimizers whose decisions affect each other. In the sequel,
we refer to this game as G(Ug, Ua).
IV. ANALYSIS OF N PLAYER SYSTEM
The fact that the objective functions are quartic in g and
quadratic in a leads to a complex analytical problem for
arbitrary N ≥ 2. We show that the best response function
of the Greedy player may have a jump discontinuity and
characterize it completely when it does.
Given a value a ∈ [0, 1], the best response function for the
greedy player, denoted by βg(a;λ) is the set of values of g that
minimize Ug for the given value of a. We note that when this
point-to-set map is a function, then it may be discontinuous,
as shown in Figure 1. This discontinuity is caused by the non-
convexity of Ug in g. An interesting result of this phenomenon
is the fact that the game G(Ug, Ua) may not have any Nash
3equilibrium (NE), leading to interesting discrete time dynamic
behavior.
Let βa(g; ρ) be the best response function for the vigilante
player (defined analogously for βg(a;λ)). Recall from [26]
(Chapter 1) that a pair (g∗, a∗) is a NE if and only if
g∗ ∈ βg(a
∗;λ) and a∗ ∈ βa(g∗; ρ). Suppose that βa(g; ρ)
and βg(a;λ) are functions (rather than point-to-set maps).
A pair (g∗, a∗) is a NE if and only if g∗ = βg(a∗;λ)
and g∗ ∈ β−1a (a∗; ρ) (or likewise a∗ = βa(g∗; ρ) and
a∗ ∈ β−1g (g
∗;λ)). Here β−1a and β−1g are the usual inverse
relations.
(a) Nash Equilibrium (b) No Nash Equilibrium
Fig. 1. In the first figure, the NE is located at the intersection of the two
curves, in this case βg(a; λ) and β−1a (g, ρ). In the second figure, no such
intersection occurs.
We now illustrate two cases for the game where N = 10;
that is there is one vigilante player and one greedy player and
eight cooperative players. In one case, a NE exists and in the
other no NE exists. Fix λ = 10. For ρ = 0.001, a (unique)
NE exists while for ρ = 0.01 there is no NE. The two cases
are illustrated in Figure 1.
We can solve precisely for the point of discontinuity in the
best response function and obtain a complete characterization
of the discontinuous best-response curve βg(a;λ). We have
already established that there are three critical points that
may come into play in finding (local) minima of the function
Ug. The discontinuity is caused by the best response moving
among two of these three points as well as the boundary value
g = 1.
We can prove easily that
r1 :=
N − 1
N(1− a)
(10)
is a global minima. To see this, note Ug(r1) = 0 and Ug itself
is strictly non-negative and thus r1 must be a global minima
since Ug attains 0 at this value.
We can also see that when
r3 :=
N − 3a+ 2
(1− a)N
−
√
−
8
λ
+
(a− 2 +N)
2
N2 (a− 1)
2
,
is real and distinct from:
r2 :=
N − 3a+ 2
(1− a)N
+
√
−
8
λ
+
(a− 2 +N)
2
N2 (a− 1)
2
,
then it is a local minima. To see this, note that evaluating the
second derivative of Ug at r3 yields:
−
1
2
N2
(
N − 1
N
)2N
(s1 · γ + s2) (N − 1)
−4
where:
s1 = 3Nλ (−1 + a) (a− 2 +N)
s2 = 8N
2a2 − 16N2a−N2λ− 2Naλ− a2λ+ 8N2+
4Nλ+ 4 aλ− 4
and
γ =
√
−
s2
N2 (1− a)2 λ
Our assumption that r3 is real implies that s2 < 0. Further,
our assumption that a ∈ (0, 1) implies that s1 < 0. Clearly,
γ > 0 (using the customary positive branch of the square root
function). It follows that s1γ+ s2 < 0. Thus, U ′g(r3) > 0 and
r3 is a local minima.
As a corollary to the previous result, we note that when it
exists and is distinct from r3, the critical point r2 is a local
maximum. To see this, we observe that Ug(g, a;λ) is a fourth
order polynomial in g with a positive coefficient for g4 when
we assume a > 0 and λ > 0. The corollary follows from the
previous results and this fact.
We now observe that the first critical point r1 is strictly less
than 1 when a < 1/N . For a ≥ 1/N , r1 ≥ 1. Thus we have
proved that for a ∈ [0, 1
N
], the behavior of βg(a;λ) on the
left-side of the discontinuity is defined by the function:
β−g (a;λ) := min
{
1,
N − 1
N(1− a)
}
= min{1, r1}. (11)
Let a+ be the point of discontinuity. We have already shown
that a+ ≥ 1/N . Clearly now to the right of a+, the value of
βg(a;λ) is controlled by the third critical point in Cg . Thus
we have:
β+g (a;λ) :=
N − 3a+ 2
(1− a)N
−
√
−
8
λ
+
(a− 2 +N)2
N2 (a− 1)
2
(12)
For a ∈ [1/N, a+], βg(a;λ) takes on its boundary value g∗ =
1. In reality, the best response is a g∗ > 1, but this is not
possible. It now suffices to compute a+. This can be done by
solving for the value of a so that:
Ug(1, a;λ) = Ug (r3, a;λ) (13)
Assuming a+ is the (unique) root on [1/N, 1] of Equation
13 we now may write:
βg(a;λ) :=
{
β−g (a;λ) if a < a+
β+g (a;λ) otherwise
(14)
Multiple (non-extraneous) roots for Equation 13, simply
indicate the presence of additional jump discontinuities as the
best response moves back and forth between the boundary
value g = 1 and g = r3. In practice we have not observed
additional jump discontinuities and we conjecture that for any
λ there is a unique a+ ∈ [1/N, 1] that completely characterizes
the discontinuity point.
4Suppose the Vigilante and Greedy players engage in iterated
play and that each player can estimate his/her throughput and
hence the other player’s strategy. From this information, each
player can compute his/her best response using βg(a;λ) and
βa(g; ρ). The player’s strategy at time t ≥ 0 can then be
updated according to the rule:
gt+1 = (βg(a
t;λ)− gt)ǫg + g
t (15)
at+1 = (βa(g
t;λ)− at)ǫa + a
t (16)
Here ǫg and ǫa are parameters that control the extent of the
player’s jump. In the case when there is no Nash equilibria, we
observe oscillatory behavior caused by the jump discontinuity
in βg . The oscillation size is directly related to the size of ǫg
and ǫa. This is illustrated in Figure 2. By contrast, when there
Fig. 2. The oscillation of the two players strategies in a discrete step iterated
game is caused by the jump discontinuity of βg .
is a Nash equilibrium, the system converges to it (as would
be expected). This is illustrated in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. The existence of a NE ensures that iterated play converges to a
system equilibrium.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTI-PLAYER SYSTEMS
We now consider two scenarios: (i) We show that the
better response behavior given by Jacobi iteration can have
convergent behavior, even in the case when there is no
Nash equilibrium, illustrating the differences in convergence
between better and best response play. (ii) We show that
the presence of an additional greedy player yields non-trivial
behavioral changes on the part of the greedy and vigilante
strategies as a result of the computation of gˆ (see Expression
6).
A. Comparison to Differential Play
In convex game-theoretic analysis, it is not uncommon to
investigate the system of differential equations generated by
Jacobi iteration (see e.g., [27]). For us, these are defined by:

a˙ = −
∂Ua(g, a; ρ)
∂a
g˙ = −
∂Ug(g, a;λ)
∂g
(17)
This model is meant to suggest that the players, rather than
computing their best response to (an estimate) of the other
player’s strategy will follow an (infinitesimal) gradient de-
scent. If a point (g∗, a∗) is an interior NE (that is, it is
not on the boundary) then necessarily, ∂Ua(g∗, a∗; ρ)/∂a =
∂Ug(g
∗, a∗;λ)/∂g = 0; i.e., each interior NE is necessarily a
fixed point of the system in Expression 17. We note that this
is a necessary condition for an interior NE, not a sufficient
condition in the case of non-convex player objective functions.
We have already observed that when λ = 10 and ρ = 0.01,
there is no NE. However, there is an interior fixed point
for System 17. Identifying a solution for System 17 requires
identifying the roots of a complex set of polynomial equations.
These can be solved in closed form (no polynomial has a
degree higher than 4) but the closed form solutions do not
yield any intuition into the properties of the underlying model.
What is interesting, is that there exist real-valued fixed points
of the differential equation system for which the system is
stable, even when the fixed point is not a NE. In particular,
when ρ = 0.01, then the point of stability is: g ≈ 0.203,
a ≈ 0.297, while for ρ = 0.001, the point of stability is
g ≈ 0.175, a ≈ 0.429, where the second fixed point is the
same as the Nash equilibrium. The intersection of the best
response curves occurs when βg(a;λ) = r3 while βa(g; ρ) is
(always) computed as:
[
arga
(
∂Ua(g, a;λ)
∂a
= 0
)]1
0
(18)
Thus the intersection of βg(a;λ) and βa(g; ρ) must occur at a
stability point for System 17. We can show that in both cases
these points are globally stable by analyzing the eigenvalues
of the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system. One can verify
that when ρ = 0.01, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
are approximated by {−1.501,−0.053}, while for ρ = 0.001
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are approximated by
{−1.981,−0.021}. Thus by Theorem 3.1 of [28], the fixed
points of the nonlinear systems are stable, even if these points
do not correspond to a NE. This is illustrated in Figure 4. It is
also worth noting that this fixed point is not globally attracting.
There are initial conditions for which the system moves toward
deadlock, which g = 1.0. These dynamics will only be realized
if the players follow a gradient descent strategy, rather than
using their best response strategies.
5Fig. 4. The phase portrait of the corresponding Jacobi Iteration with N = 10,
λ = 10, ρ = 0.01. Note this attracting fixed is not a NE.
B. Additional Greedy and Vigilante Players
An interesting property of this model is its behavior in the
presence of multiple greedy or vigilante players. In these cases,
it may be impossible for a vigilante player to know the number
of greedy players. Consequently, she may choose to assume
there is always (exactly) one greedy player and use Expression
(6) to estimate g for use in βa(g; ρ). In the case when there
is more than one greedy player, this will lead the vigilante
to overestimate the individual strategies of the greedy players,
but this assumption is consistent with what a vigilante could
actually communicate. Under this assumption, the vigilante
uses the formula:
Θˆ(gˆ, a) := gˆ(1− a)
(
1−
1
N
)N−2
. (19)
Then the vigilante will attempt to minimize:
Ua(gˆ, a; ρ) =
(
Θˆ(gˆ, a)− Φ0
)2
+ ρ
(
a−
1
N
)2
. (20)
Meanwhile, for M greedy players we have:
Θi(gi, g−i, a) := gi(1− a)
(
1−
1
N
)N−M−1∏
k 6=i
(1− gk).
(21)
The functions Ugi(gi, a;λi) are defined analogously. Notice
that greedy player i does not need to know about the existence
of greedy player j for these objective functions to make sense.
In the case when there are additional vigilante players, then
we modify Expression (20) slightly to:
Uai(gˆ, ai; ρi) =
(
Θˆ(gˆ, ai)− Φ0
)2
+ ρi
(
ai −
1
N
)2
Additional vigilante players will simply see vigilante activity
as the result of a greedy play. Some interesting behaviors occur
in both the case when there are additional greedy or vigilante
players. In the case when λ1 = λ2 = 10 and ρ = 0.01,
we obtain convergence to a NE, unlike when there was only
a single greedy player with λ = 10 and ρ = 0.01. This is
illustrated in Figure 5. In this case, the two greedy player
converge to the same value at equilibrium. There are still
parameters (as before) for which the system does not converge,
but it is interesting to note that the introduction of additional
Fig. 5. Convergence in the case when N = 10, λ1 = λ2 = 10 and
ρ = 0.01 and there are two greedy players.
greedy players causes convergence for parameters that were
non-convergent in the single greedy-player case.
Finally, we consider the case with two vigilante players and
one greedy player. As one would expect, the two vigilante
players overestimate the greedy player’s move and the system
converges to a near deadlock state, with the two vigilante
players unable to recover from the fact that they don’t know
about each other [25]. This is illustrated in Figure 6. On the
Fig. 6. Convergence in the case when N = 10, λ = 10 and ρ1 = ρ2 =
0.001 and there are two vigilante players.
other hand, if the vigilantes adjust their ρi (i = 1, 2) upward
to be more sensitive to their play, then the system does not
converge, but oscillates as in the case with one greedy player
and one vigilante player. In this case, however, the oscillation
is about access rates g that are almost fair. This is illustrated
in Figure 7.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we formulated a multiplayer distributed re-
source access game in which some players have a greedy
objective function and other players behave as vigilantes modi-
fying their access probabilities to punish perceived greediness.
Greedy players will back-off from a pure greedy strategy if the
greedy strategy leads to poor payoff. We showed that the best
response function for the greedy player under our formulation
has a jump discontinuity, which leads to conditions under
which there is no Nash equilibrium in the game. To understand
this property, we formulated an exact representation for the
6Fig. 7. Convergence in the case when N = 10, λ = 10 and ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.1
and there are two vigilante players.
greedy player’s best response function in the case when there
was one greedy player and one vigilante player. We used
this formulation to show conditions under which a Nash
equilibrium exists. We also illustrated that in the case when
there is no Nash Equilibrium, then the discrete dynamic system
generated from fictitious play does not converge, but oscillates
indefinitely as a result of the jump discontinuity. Finally, we
discussed the cases when there was more than one greedy
player and more than one vigilante.
In the future, we will investigate theoretical results on this
model when there are a (small) number of vigilante and
greedy players. It is clear from Figure 2 that the oscillations
caused by the jump discontinuity have a somewhat complex
periodic behavior. It would be interesting to understand how
this periodicity is related to ǫg and ǫa. In addition to this,
we will study and compare in detail the discrete dynamical
system arising from fictitious play to the continuous dynamics
that arise from better-response dynamics (gradient descent or
Jacobi iteration). Finally, there is a unique control theoretic
problem embedded in this model. In the case where there
were multiple vigilante’s, we saw that it was easy for the
vigilante’s to overreact to each other. However, by modifying
their respective ρi, the system was brought to a better point
of (dynamic) stability (see Figures 6 and 7). Dynamically
controlling ρi to improve system performance in the case of
multiple greedy and vigilante players is of interest.
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